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Recent Developments in Insider Trading
Through Swiss Bank Accounts: An End
to the "Double Standard"
In recent years, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
has increased its efforts to combat insider trading1 in publicly-traded
securities in order to ensure fairness, honesty, and confidence in the
United States securities markets.2  Nevertheless, insiders3 continue to
employ Swiss banks as a conduit for their trading activity with little
fear of detection.
While Swiss banks trade securities for their account holders on
American exchanges,4 Swiss bank secrecy laws prohibit the identity of
account holders from being disclosed except under limited circum-
stances.' The combination of Swiss bank participation on American
securities exchanges and strict bank secrecy laws has created a "double
standard" for the prosecutibn of inside traders in the United States.'
Insiders are subject to securities regulations in the United States, yet
those who trade through Swiss bank accounts are able to evade these
regulations. According to the SEC, this double standard must be elimi-
nated to maintain the effectiveness of federal securities laws and to en-
1 "Insider trading" is commonly used to describe the act of purchasing or selling securities
while in possession of material, non-public information about an issuer or the trading market for
an issuer's securities. See 2 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1037 (2d ed. 1961); Cary, Insider
Trading in Stocks, 21 Bus. LAw. 1009 (1966); In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907
(1961). Those who engage in insider trading may be referred to as "insider traders" or "insiders."
2 Memorandum of the Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of the Insider Trading
SanctionsAct of1982, 14 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1705 (Oct. 1, 1982) [hereinafter cited as SEC
Memorandum].
3 The term "insider" may be broadly defined to include anyone who has "access, directly or
indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the
personal benefit of anyone." In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
4 Unlike the banking system in the United States, Swiss banks are permitted to engage in
retail stock brokerage activities, as well as conventional commercial banking operations. Meyer,
Swiss Banking Secrecy and Its Legal Implications in the United States, 14 NEw ENG. L. REv. 18,
45 (1978).
5 See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
6 Outline by John M. Fedders, Director of the Division of Enforcement, Securities and Ex-
change Commission, in preparation for an address before the Tenth Annual Securities Regulation
Institute, University of California, San Diego, January 1983, at 23 (material dated Nov. 1, 1982).
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sure the integrity of United States capital markets.
7
In the fall of 1981, the Federal District Court for the Southern
District of New York handed down two decisions which penetrated the
veil of bank secrecy in Switzerland.' Such action paved the way for the
1982 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and
Switzerland regarding cooperation in the enforcement of United States
insider trading regulations.9 In this Memorandum, the Swiss have
agreed to establish a procedure which will permit American authorities
to investigate alleged insider trading violations.
This Comment will examine the background and developments
leading to the Memorandum of Understanding and the potential im-
pact of the Memorandum on insider trading activities in the United
States. It will argue that the breakdown of the Swiss bank secrecy bar-
rier will help eliminate the de facto double standard for insider trading,
yet will not reduce legitimate foreign trading activity on American se-
curities exchanges.
I. THE PROBLEM
Securities trading by Swiss banks in the United States is substan-
tial. In 1981, total foreign trading on American stock markets equalled
$75 billion. Roughly $14.8 billion (almost twenty percent) of this total
came from Swiss banks.10 Although the exact number of Americans
who hold Swiss bank accounts is unknown, 1 the popularity of the ac-
counts has remained high for decades because of Switzerland's reputa-
tion for security; social, political and economic stability; and bank
secrecy.
12
In its attempt to combat insider trading, the SEC relies heavily on
7 Id
8 Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Banca Della Svizzera Iialiana, 92 F.R.D. II1
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Com-
mon Stock, and Call Options for the Common Stock of Santa Fe Int'l Corporation, et al., [1981-
1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,323 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1981) [hereinafter
cited as Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Santa Fe Int'l Corp.]. See infra notes 98-126 and
accompanying text.
9 US.-Swiss Memorandum on Insider Trading, 14 SEc. REG. L. REP. (BNA) 1737 (Oct. 8,
1982). This Memorandum was signed Aug. 31, 1982. See infra notes 130-53 and accompanying
text.
10 N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1982, at 34, col 6. Although Swiss banks maintain a small volume of
domestic stocks, they trade extensively for U.S. clients on foreign exchanges. Dagon, Securities
Regulation in Switzerland, 6 VAND. J. OF TRANSNAT'L L. 524 (1973).
11 It was estimated in 1970 that between 20,000 and 30,000 Americans own Swiss bank ac-
counts with an aggregate value of $100-200 million. Comment, Swiss Banks and Their American
Clients: .4 Fading Romance, 3 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 37 n.2 (1972).
12 N.Y. Times, supra note 10.
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assistance from the major stock exchanges and the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers which supervises the over-the-counter mar-
kets.13  Computers and information-retrieval devices monitor the
securities markets throughout the trading day and signal significant
price movements or unusual trading volume. 14 When the SEC believes
that trading violations have occurred, it evaluates buy and sell orders to
determine the source of the trading activity.15
Swiss banks, however, maintain "omnibus accounts" with Ameri-
can brokerage houses which permit them to trade for their customers in
the bank's name. 6 Under these circumstances, inspection of the bro-
ker's records by the SEC only indicates the trades conducted for the
bank's account, and thus prohibits the SEC from determining the real
party in interest.
17
II. BANK SECRECY UNDER Swiss LAW
The Swiss attitude toward bank secrecy developed principally
from the high priority placed on privacy in civil law countries.' 8 The
right to financial privacy, for example, is considered a well-entrenched
guarantee which dates back to the Swiss Banking Law of 1934.1" This
law was enacted, in part, to. prevent Nazi agents from tracking the as-
sets of fleeing German Jews who kept money in Swiss banks.2"
Differences with regard to privacy protection have an important
13 Louis, The Unwinnable War on Insider Trading, FORTUNE, July 13, 1981, at 76.
14 Id
15 Id
16 Kelly, United States Foreign Policy Efforts to Penetrate Bank Secrecy in Switzerlandfrom
1940 to 1975, 6 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 211, 237 (1976).
17 Id For examples of the ways in which omnibus accounts violate U.S. law, see United States
v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 947 (1966) (trusts holding Swiss bank
accounts were used by American promoters to sell unregistered over-the-ounter stock to the
American public at manipulated price levels); United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944 (2d Cir.
1968), cert. denied 392 U.S. 961 (1968) (German banks were used by insiders to sell unregistered
stock at artificially high prices, while a foreign branch of an American bank was used to eliminate
any connection between the proceeds of the sales and the compensation to brokers for selling the
stock). According to the SEC, omnibus accounts are also used by underwriters of "hot issues"
who secretly purchase shares of new issues for their own accounts through Swiss banks without
disclosing this critical fact to the public. In addition, omnibus accounts have been used exten-
sively by both Americans and foreigners to violate the Federal Reserve Board's margin require-
ments. This practice has been curtailed due to the enactment of Regulation T in 1969. Foreign
Bank Secrecy: Hearings on S. 3678 and HR 15073 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
of the Senate Comm on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 263-65 (1970).
18 Comment, Secret Foreign Bank Accounts, 6 Tax. INT'L L.J. 105, 115 (1970).
19 Mueller, The Swiss Banking Secret, 18 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 360, 361-62 (1969).
20 Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1982, at 4, col. 1. For a more thorough background of the origins of
Swiss bank secrecy, see N. FAITH, SAFETY IN NUMBERS (1982).
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bearing upon the different positions taken by Switzerland and the
United States on bank secrecy.21 In common law countries such as the
United States, the right to financial privacy is generally less developed
and not as pervasively recognized.22 A bank's obligation to keep ac-
count records secret is implied and discretionary, and is regulated by
state law. 23 American banks consequently have a duty to disclose cus-
tomer account information only if compelled by a court, grand jury, or
the government.24
In general, Swiss banks are obliged to maintain strict secrecy. Any
unjustifiable disclosure of confidential information, including the iden-
tity of the customer,25 may result in criminal prosecution under three
Swiss statutes.26 First, the Swiss Banking Act establishes criminal pen-
alties for any employee or agent of a bank who discloses the confiden-
tial information of a bank customer.27 Second, Article 273 of the Swiss
Penal Code makes it a crime for any person to communicate secret
information, including banking information, to a foreign official or a
private enterprise.28 Third, Article 162 of the Swiss Penal Code out-
laws the disclosure of a manufacturing or business secret by any person
who has a statutory or contractual duty to guard such a secret.29 In
21 Meyer, supra note 4, at 22.
22.Id at 20-21.
23 Id at 23.
24 Id
25 The holder of a Swiss bank account may choose to identify his or her account by name or
by number. With numbered accounts, only a few top bank officers are able to identify the account
with the name of the owner. Numbered accounts, therefore, are not anonymous, but solely an
internal device to protect customers from the indiscretion of staff members. Swiss banks will not
accept anonymous funds. Comment, supra note 18, at 122.
26 In contrast, in common law countries such as the United States, it is often only an ethical
violation to divulge confidential information acquired in a privileged position. See, e.g., MODEL
CODE OF PROFEssIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY Canon 4 (1979).
27 Article 47 of the Swiss Banking Act states:
Whoever divulges a secret entrusted to him in his capacity as an officer, employee,
mandatory, liquidator, or commissioner of a bank, as a representative of the Banking Com-
mission, officer or employee of a recognized auditing company, or who has become aware of
such a secret in this capacity, and whoever tries to induce others to violate professional se-
crecy, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding 50,000 francs.
Loi f6d6rale sur les banques et les caisses d'6pargne du 8 novembre 1934 art. 47, 51 Recueil officiel
des lois et ordonnances de la Conf6d6ration suisse [ROLF] 121 (1935). An unofficial English
translation may be found in UNION BANK OF SWrIZERLAND, Swiss FEDERAL BANKING LAW
(1972).
28 Swiss Penal Code Article 273, states in part: "any person who makes available a manufac-
turing or business secret to a foreign official or private enterprise or to the agents thereof shall be
punished by imprisonment or in serious cases to 'reclusion."' SCHWEIZERICHES
STRAFGESTZBUCH art. 273, Code Pf-NALE SUISSE art. 273, CODICE PENALE SVIZZERO art. 273.
29 Article 162 states: "Any person who reveals a manufacturing or business secret which he
was bound to keep by virtue of a statutory or contractual obligation, and any person who profits
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addition to these statutory criminal sanctions, disclosure of customer
information by a Swiss bank may subject the bank and its officials to
civil liability in tort and contract" and to disciplinary sanctions by the
Swiss Banking Commission. These sanctions may include the revoca-
tion of the bank's authority to do business.3'
The enforcement of Swiss bank secrecy is not absolute, however,
but applies only to unauthorized third parties who seek to obtain bank-
ing information without a court order.32 Bank customers may always
require the bank to produce any information relating to their ac-
counts. 33 Furthermore, because Swiss federal and cantonal procedural
laws supersede the privacy rights of the account holder, bank secrecy
generally cannot be asserted in criminal or civil proceedings brought
pursuant to Swiss federal or cantonal jurisdiction.
34
Swiss banks will release confidential customer information to for-
eign governments for use in criminal prosecutions when the crime is
recognized by the Swiss Penal Code. 35 The Swiss government, how-
ever, historically has not recognized insider trading as a criminal viola-
tion,36 and therefore banks have refused to extend cooperation to the
thereby shall, upon complaint being fied, be punished by imprisonment or a fine." STGB art.
162, C.P. art. 162, COD. PEN. art. 162.
30 Memorandum of Defendant Banca Della Svizzera Itaiana in Opposition to Plaintiffs Ap-
plication for an Order Compelling Answers and Imposing Sanctions, at 12, Securities and Ex-
change Comm'n v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (1981) [hereinafter cited as BSI
Defendant's Memorandum].
31 Id
32 Note, Swiss Banks and the Avoidance of American Tax and Securities Laws: An Assessment
Based on Proposed Legislation, 3 N.Y.U. J. IN'L L. & PoL. 94, 97 (1970).
33 Meyer, supra note 4, at 29. The Swiss public interest also provides exceptions in cases
involving heirs, family law, debt collections and bankruptcy, international money transfers, and
criminal conduct. Comment, supra note 18, at 119. Swiss law, however, contains no provision
allowing foreign authorities to compel disclosure of information protected by bank secrecy laws.
BSI Defendant's Memorandum, supra note 30, at 13.
34 This obligation of Swiss banks to disclose customer information is an exception to the rule.
In general, however, Swiss banks are obligated to maintain secrecy; any unjustifiable violation of
bank secrecy may result in a claim for damages as well as penal sanctions. Mueller, supra note 19,
at 377.
35 Comment, supra note 18, at 119.
36 Louis, supra note 13, at 82. In Switzerland, securities violations are not considered crimes,
but rather "administrative" problems. In contrast to the highly regulated Swiss banking system,
the Swiss system of securities regulation, to the extent it exists at all, is primarily a system of self-
regulation. Dagon, supra note 10, at 511. Although mutual funds are under the strict supervision
of the Swiss Banking Commission, Switzerland does not have a counterpart to the SEC. Id at
511-12. As a consequence, certain segments of the financial industry, such as the commodities
industry, are notorious for underhanded activity. See, e.g., In the Matter of Banque Populaire,
CFTC Docket No. 80-8 (Oct. 9, 1981), where an administrative law judge at the Commodities
Futures Trading Commission barred Banque Populaire Suisse from trading on United States con-
tracts markets for 90 days because it failed to provide information concerning the bank's silver
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SEC during insider trading investigations. This refusal has created the
loophole which inside traders have used to escape "the regulatory net
carefully woven by Congress. ' '37
The frustration of securities laws in the United States because of
Swiss bank accounts is particularly detrimental to the positive image of
Swiss banks.38 Thus, most Swiss banks are quick to eliminate custom-
ers who engage in suspicious transactions.39 As a result, the flow of
American dollars to Swiss banks is generally deposited and withdrawn
for legitimate ends.'
Furthermore, in Switzerland, support for the ban on insider trad-
ing and the lifting of bank secrecy laws has been mounting.41 The
Social Democrats claim bank secrecy has made Switzerland a haven
for underworld criminals and tax evaders,42 and has encouraged inter-
nal corruption within the Swiss banking system.43 Swiss bankers re-
spond that because much of their foreign business" is derived from
their reputation for confidentiality, the lifting of bank secrecy laws will
weaken the country's position as an international financial capital.45
Nevertheless, the Swiss government has reacted in favor of public
bullion futures positions and the identity of customers trading these futures in the bank's name.
The judge rejected the bank's argument that Swiss privacy laws prohibited disclosure of this infor-
mation and thus superseded U.S. law. AL.JHolds Swiss Bank Under Jurisdiction of CFTC, LEGAL
TIMEs OF WASHINGTON, Oct. 26, 1981, at 11. In relation to this case and the problems on the
Swiss commodities exchanges such as "boiler room" sales tactics and outright fraud, see CFTC
Tests Bank Secrecy in Switzerland as Swiss Commodity Firms Battle Fraud, Wall St. J., Mar. 24,
1980, at 32, coL I.
3' Federal Response to OPEC's Country Investments in the United States (Part 2): Hearings
BeforeaSubomm. of the House Comm on Government Operations, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 61 (1981)
(Statement of James Gallagher, President, Pacific Stock Exchange) [hereinafter cited as Federal
Response Hearings].
38 Only recently have the Swiss come to recognize this harmful effect. See ECONOMIST, Jan.
21, 1978, at 111, which discusses the Swiss banks' adamant opposition to SEC intervention.
39 Meyer, supra note 4, at 51. Swiss banks which engage in illegal transactions in the United
States are generally small, private, regional institutions with lesser reputations to uphold. Id at
52. In the Santa Fe Int'l case, however, five major Swiss banks were charged with involvement in
insider trading. See infra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
40 Kelly, supra note 16, at 241.
41 In 1979, 60% of those polled by the Swiss Bankers' Association said they would support the
bank revision measure. Wall St. J., June 23, 1980, at 27, coL 2.
42 Id
43 The Social Democrats have supported a bank revision initiative since 1977 when the man-
agers of the Chiasso branch of the Swiss Credit Bank (the country's third largest) were caught
running an off-the-records bank and funneling deposits into a mysterious conglomerate which
they owned. Id
44 Foreign deposits in Swiss banks totalled $115.06 billion at the end of 1978. Id
45 In addition to bank secrecy, Swiss bank popularity also stems from a well-established repu-
tation of banking experience, multilingual ability, and Switzerland's political and economic stabil-
ity. Id
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sentiment by drafting legislation which relaxes the Swiss bank secrecy
laws. If passed, the law will permit Swiss bank authorities to inform
similar agencies in other countries of suspected illegal bank activity,
and thus make it easier for the SEC to investigate securities
violations.46
III. INSIDER TRADING REGULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Some economists claim that insider trading harms neither individ-
uals nor the economy.4' They argue that by permitting insiders to
trade based on material, non-public information,4" the financial mar-
kets are brought closer to full efficiency because all relevant informa-
tion is reflected in the marketplace.49 They also argue that the investor
who trades with the insider on an impersonal exhange would conduct
the trade with someone else even if the insider was not involved.5"
These arguments do not consider the problems faced by exchange
specialists and marketmakers who are sometimes obligated to trade se-
curities at prices which do not reflect the value of the inside informa-
tion and thus often incur great losses when trading with insiders.5'
Furthermore, insider trading undermines the confidence of millions of
small investors in the fairness and integrity of American securities mar-
kets. This confidence plays an important role in keeping the securities
markets functioning smoothly.52 Finally, many investors believe insider
46 N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1982, at 24, col. 2. The legislation does not permit Swiss authorities to
pass on information relating to criminal offenses such as tax evasion. Passage of the legislation is
expected to take about two years. Id Although this proposal will not affect the Swiss-American
Memorandum of Understanding, see infra notes 130-53 and accompanying text, dealing with in-
sider trading, it demonstrates the trend in Swiss legislation toward weakening bank secrecy laws.
47 One proponent of this theory is Henry C. Manne, Professor of Law and Economics at Em-
ory University. See Seligman, An Economic Defense of Insider Trading, FORTUNE, Sept. 5, 1983,
at 48.
48 "Material" information is any information to which a reasonable man would attach impor-
tance in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question. TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965).
49 Louis, supra note 13, at 82. An efficient market is one in which prices immediately adjust to
changes in underlying realties and thus always reflect everything known about the company's
prospects. Id
50 Id ; see H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
51 SEC Memorandum, supra note 2, at 1706. Exchange specialists and market makers are
required to provide market liquidity by standing ready to buy or sell at stated prices. This liquid-
ity helps ensure an orderly market advantageous to all investors. Id
52 See Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1981, at 39, col. 2. This sentiment is reflected in the statement that
"no player should have a priority position." The SEC Swats at Insider Trading, Bus. WK., Apr.
19, 1982, at 96 (quoting John M. Fedders, SEC Director of Enforcement). According to SEC
Chairman John Shad, "fair and honest markets are an essential predicate for the maintenance of
investor confidence." Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
Insider Trading
5:658(1983)
trading should be barred because it is simply unfair. The unfair advan-
tage for insiders is not that they possess more information than the in-'
vesting public, but that the investing public is unable to acquire access
to this information.53
Rule lOb-5 under the Securities Exchange Act prohibits the use of
untrue statements, omissions which make other statements misleading,
and other fraudulent or deceitful acts and practices in connection with
the purchase and sale of a security.54 Trading securities based upon
material, non-public information generally violates Rule lOb-5 unless
such information is first released to the investing public. Thus, accord-
ing to the Supreme Court in Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Texas Gu[/fSulphur Co. , anyone in possession of material information
must disclose this information or abstain from trading.5 6 This require-
ment eliminates inherent inequalities in the marketplace by ensuring
that investors have relatively equal access to material information with
which to make informed judgments.57
The Supreme Court has restricted Rule lOb-5 liability to those in-
vestors who have an affirmative duty to disclose material information.
In Chiarella v. United States,58 the Court held that an employee of a
financial printer who obtained confidential information concerning a
planned tender offer had no fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the
target company and thus could not be convicted under Rule lOb-5.5 9
According to the Court, a duty to disclose arises from the relationship
between parties and not merely from one's ability to acquire informa-
tion because of his or her position in the market.6
53 Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders and Informational Advantages Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv. 322, 346 (1979).
54 Rule lOb-5(c) states in part: "[ilt shall be unlawful for any person... to engage in any act,
practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1980).
55 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1979). In Texas Gru/fSulphur, of-
ficers, directors, and employees of the company made substantial stock purchases in the company
before publicly announcing the discovery of a major copper and zinc mine.
56 Id at 848.
57 Id
58 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
59 Chiarella, an employee for the financial printer, obtained confidential information regard-
ing several tender offers in the course of printing up the tender offer proposals. He later traded the
securities based on this information. The Court held that there exists no general duty to disclose
before trading on material, non-public information. Rather, such a duty arises from the existence
of a fiduciary relationship. Id at 227-35. According to the Court, there can be no duty to disclose
where the person who has traded on inside information was not a corporation's agent, was not a
fiduciary, or was not a person in whom the sellers of the securities had placed their trust and
confidence. Id at 232.
60 Id at 232-33, n.14.
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In Chiarella, the Supreme Court did not decide whether the em-
ployee's breach of his duty of silence to his employer and his em-
ployer's corporate client (the acquiring company) violated Rule
lOb-5. 6' Shortly after Chiarella, however, the Second Circuit held that
the duty of a securities trader to his employer and the employer's cli-
ents prohibits him from trading on confidential, non-public informa-
tion obtained in the course of his work.62 In reaching its conclusion,
the court cited the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Nafta-
Ain,63 which stated that the securities laws were enacted not only to pro-
tect investors,64 but also "to achieve a high standard of business ethics
m ..in every facet of the securities industry."
65
In an effort to recoup any ground lost in Chiarella, the SEC issued
Rule 14e-3. 66 Rule 14e-3 avoids the fiduciary duty question by ban-
ning any trading on advance knowledge of tender offers by any person
who knows or should know that the information comes from the target
company, the acquiring company, or the agents of either company, un-
less the information and its source are first publicly disclosed.67 Since
such disclosure would undoubtedly remove the profit incentive to
trade, the regulation may be considered an outright prohibition against
trading on material, non-public information regarding tender offers.68
Rule lOb-5 is not only applicable to traditional insiders,69 but to
anyone having a relationship to a company which gives them access to
material, non-public information.70  This includes "tippees" who re-
ceive material, non-public information from an insider or other person
61 Id at 235-37 (Stevens, J., concurring).
62 United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
63 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
64 Id at 775.
65 Id (quoting Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375
U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963)).
66 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1980).
67 Id
68 Louis, supra note 13, at 75. A case involving Rule 14e-3 has yet to come before the
Supreme Court.
69 Traditional insiders are generally regarded as corporate officers, directors, and controlling
shareholders.
70 Thus, traditional insiders and other corporate employees with access to material, non-public
information have a duty to disclose due to their relationship to the corporation. CMarella, 445
U.S. at 227. Rule lob-5 has been applied to: employees, Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1968); broker-dealers, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974), Securities and Exchange Commission v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), Kidder, Peabody & Co., 43 S.E.C. 911
(1968); investment bankers, United States v. Newman, 644 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981); and financial
columnists, Zweig v. The Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir. 1975).
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related to the company.71 In Dirks v. Securities and Exchange Commis-
siot, 72 however, the Supreme Court restricted tippee liability by stating
that a tippee has a duty to refrain from insider trading only if the in-
sider who passed on the material, non-public information did so for
personal benefit. Without some "personal gain" to the insider, the tip-
pee owes no fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a company.73
Current penalties for insider trading impose little downside risk on
offenders, and thus are a very weak deterrent. Although the SEC can
refer cases to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution,74 con-
viction requires proof that the insider transaction was a culpable act
and that criminal motives existed. As a result, indictments are rare.75
Rather than risk acquittal in criminal prosecutions, the SEC generally
obtains injunctions against inside traders in civil actions where liability
is limited to the disgorgement of any profits made on the transaction.
These cases are usually settled by consent decree, whereby the accused
admits no guilt, disgorges all profits, and promises not to commit the
offense in the future.76 Because such penalties are lenient and success-
ful criminal prosecution occurs in only a fraction of the violations, the
risk/reward ratio for the inside trader is very favorable.77
Recognizing that current penalties do not provide sufficient deter-
rence, the SEC is lobbying Congress to pass the Insider Trading Sanc-
71 Tippees have a duty to disclose because they know their source was not supposed to disclose
the material, non-public information. Chiarella, 443 U.S. at 230, n.12. For a discussion of tippee
liability, see Shapiro, 495 F.2d at 228; Ross v. Licht, 263 F. Supp. 395, 409-10 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
72 1983 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 99,255 (U.S. S. Ct. July 1, 1983). In Dirks, petitioner,
while working as a securities analyst, was informed by a former official of an insurance holding
company of massive fraud at the company. Based on this information, he advised several clients
to sell their shares in the company. Neither petitioner nor his firm owned or traded any stock in
the company. In addition, the facts revealed that the insider who tipped petitioner was motivated
by a desire to expose the fraud rather than by personal or monetary gain. Nevertheless, the SEC
charged petitioner with insider trading, claiming that as a matter of law, anyone receiving mate-
rial, non-public information from a corporate insider "inherits" the insider's legal obligation to
"disclose or abstain from trading." Id
73 According to the Court, "the test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or
indirectly, from his disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to
stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative breach." Id Thus, there
must be a breach of the insider's fiduciary duty before the tippee inherits the duty to disclose or
abstain from trading. Id
74 The maximum penalty is a five-year prison term. 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1976).
75 Burne, Dealing with Insider Trading, INT'L MGrNT., Feb. 1979, 48, 50. There have been only
six convictions. Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
76 Louis, supra note 13, at 72.
77 Judges have refused to sign consent decrees which they consider to have no deterrent effect
on insider trading and to lack in overall fairness to the investing public. New SEC Proposal to
Settle Insider Case is Rejected, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1983, at 23, col. 1.
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tions Act.78 This legislation would allow the government to recover in
civil suits up to three times the amount of profits gained or losses
avoided in the illegal trading. It would also increase the maximum fine
for most criminal violations under the Securities Exchange Act from
$10,000 to $100,000. 71 These changes are designed to have a prophy-
lactic effect by raising the level of risk for insider trading.80
The need for such strict measures becomes continually more ap-
parent in the 1980s. With increasingly volatile options markets8l and
the increased number of corporate takeovers, it is very easy for some-
one with inside information to use a Swiss bank account "to run rough-
shod through the financial markets, with little likelihood of being
caught."8 2
IV. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND Swiss LAW
Banking secrecy has been a troublesome issue in American-Swiss
relations since World War H. In 1945, the United States controlled the
bargaining power. To force Switzerland to disclose information re-
garding German funds held in Swiss banks,83 it froze Swiss funds in the
United States, blacklisted Swiss firms, and refused to trade goods nec-
essary for Swiss survival.' 4 During the bull market of the 1960s, how-
ever, this balance of power rapidly shifted to the Swiss as American
citizens began using Swiss bank accounts to violate and evade Ameri-
can security laws.
85
The famous "Interhandel" controversy86 of the 1950s resulted in
78 SEC Memorandum, supra note 2.
79 The current limit is contained in the Securities Exchange Act, § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff
(1976).
80 Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
81 Even those with relatively little to invest are able to exploit inside information by purchas-
ing call options to acquire a target company's stock at close to the current market price. Such
options are cheap and can rapidly multiply in value if an acquisition proposal is subsequently
announced. Block & Prussin, "Outsider" Duties in Insider Trading, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 28, 1981, at
19. Information concerning impending tender offers or merger proposals is particularly difficult to
keep secret due to the elaborate filing and disclosure requirements imposed by the SEC for such
transactions. Corporations planning an offer must make preparations requiring the assistance of
such non-insiders as lawyers, paralegals, investment bankers, secretaries, printing companies, ac-
countants, etc. Id at 20.
82 Louis, supra note 13, at 78.
83 Meyer, supra note 4, at 40.
84 Kelly, supra note 16, at 236.
85 Id American investors used Swiss bank accounts to violate margin requirements, manipu-
late market prices, and retain short-swing insider trading profits. Id at 237-38.
86 Interhandel, or Societe Internationale as it was later called, was a holding company organ-
ized to retain controlling interests in foreign enterprises of I.G. Farben, the Nazi multinational
corporation. During World War II, the United States seized the assets of an American subsidiary
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the case of Societe Internationale v. Rogers,87 which concerned the rela-
tionship between United States discovery and foreign non-disclosure
rules. In Societe Internationale, the Supreme Court held that a foreign
government's prohibition against document disclosure was not an abso-
lute bar in determining whether a foreign company should be relieved
from compliance with a discovery order.8 Rather, the company's
"good faith" effort in attempting to secure government permission to
disclose documents subject to foreign secrecy laws was a vital factor to
consider.8 9 This good faith test has been incorporated into a revised
draft of the Second Restatement of Foreign Relations Law.90
The Second Restatement of Foreign Relations Law91 requires a
balancing of interests when two states have jurisdiction to prescribe
and enforce rules of law which require inconsistent conduct on the part
of the individual.92 The revised draft of the Second Restatement also
of Interhandel as enemy-owned property. Societe Intemationale sued the U.S. government after
the war to recover these assets. Meyer, supra note 4, at 41.
87 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
88 This controversy arose during the trial when the U.S. government asked for the release of"
bank documents. Interhandel's Swiss bank refused to release the documents asserting that such
disclosure would violate the Swiss Penal Code, Business Secrets Law, and Banking Law. Id at
200. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
89 According to the Supreme Court, inability of a foreign company to comply with a produc-
tion order "fostered neither by its own conduct nor by circumstances within its control... consti-
tutes a weighty excuse for non-production." 357 U.S. at 211.
90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 420 reporter's note 5 (Tent.
Draft, Mar. 1982).
91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 40 (1965).
92 The interests to be balanced include: a) the vital national interests of each of the states;
b) the extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon
the person; c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other
state; d) the nationality of the person; and e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either
state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state. Id
Decisions of U.S. courts which have expressly engaged in a balancing of interests include: United
States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968) (the importance of U.S. antitrust
enforcement outweighed potential exposure to civil liability and economic loss resulting from
German laws prohibiting bank records disclosure); United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981) (the need to collect taxes and prosecute tax fraud
outweighed Switzerland's privacy laws preventing a U.S. corporation from disclosing records of
its Swiss subsidiaries); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960) (Canadian laws which may
prohibit the removal of bank documents outweighed shareholders' request for subpoena duces
tecum of bank records located in Canada); Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35
(2d Cir. 1972) (Swiss bank secrecy laws prohibiting disclosure of clients' identity outweighed a
request for identity information unnecessary to defendant's case); In re Grand Jury Proceedings,
532 F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976) (necessity of appearance before a grand jury outweighed nonresident
alien's exposure to criminal prosecution in his own country for violating bank secrecy laws); Se-
curities and Exchange Comm'n v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(the importance of information in apprehending and prosecuting inside traders outweighed the
potential exposure of Swiss banks to criminal liability if such information was disclosed).
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requires a balancing test. Where the original Second Restatement ap-
plies to rules of law which require inconsistent conduct, the revised
draft focuses directly on the production of documents or other informa-
tion important to an action or jurisdiction.9 3 In addition to weighing
various factors to determine whether such documents should be pro-
duced, the revised draft adopts a "good faith" test similar to that used
by the Supreme Court in Societe Internationale v. Rogers.94
The foreign response to United States discovery requests has gen-
erally been that such pre-trial or investigative procedures may be ap-
plied to persons or documents located in another country only with that
country's permission.95 The United States, however, takes the position
that persons who do business in the United States, or who bring them-
selves within United States jurisdiction to prescribe and adjudicate,
must be subject to the burdens, as well as the benefits, of United States
law.96 The revised draft supports the United States position, subject to
the requirement of reasonableness.97
V. THE SANTA FE CASE
The destructive impact of insider trading on investor confidence is
apparent in the events surrounding the 1981 takeover of the Santa Fe
International Corporation by the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. On
93 Section 420(l)(c) of the revised draft includes the following factors: "the importance to the
investigation or litigation of the documents or other information requested; the degree of specific-
ity of the request; in which of the states involved the documents or information originated; the
extent to which compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the state
where the information is located and the possibility of alternative means of securing the informa-
tion." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 420(l)(c) (Tent. Draft, Mar.
1982).
94 Section 420(2) states that if disclosure of information located outside the United States is
prohibited by the law of the state where the information is located, the court may not impose
criminal sanctions of contempt, dismissal, or default on a party which failed to comply with the
production order if the party made a good faith effort to secure permission from foreign authori-
ties to make the information available. Thus, before criminal sanction can be imposed, "deliber-
ate concealment or removal of information or a failure to make a good faith effort" must be
shown. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 420(2) (Tent. Draft, Mar. 1982).
The "good faith" test has been applied with the balancing of interests test in: United States v.
First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968) (Citibank had not shown good faith in its
attempts to comply with the subpoena duces tecum); United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324
(9th Cir. 1981) (defendant had not shown good faith in failing to comply with an IRS summons);
Ohio v. Arthur Andersen Co., 570 F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 439 U.S. 833 (1978); In
re Westinghouse Electric Corp., 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977); Securities and Exchange Comm'n
v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
95 Id
96 Id




October 5, 1981, Santa Fe announced a definitive merger agreement in
which it would become a United States subsidiary of the Kuwait Petro-
leum Corporation. The tender offer included a cash purchase of all
outstanding stock for $51 per share.98 The next day, after forty-three
minutes of trading on the New York Stock Exchange, the price of
Santa Fe stock had increased from $24.75 per share to $43.75 per share,
and trading was halted due to an influx of orders creating an imbalance
on the buy side of the market.99
Although this increase of $19 per share represents a seventy-seven
percent increase in the value of the stock, the percentage increase in
call option contracts 00 was far more dramatic. When the Santa Fe
stock resumed trading on the New York Stock Exchange, the market
for call option contracts for Santa Fe stock had risen 1,325%.111 Trad-
ers who sold options on or before October 1 without owning the under-
lying stock102 lost millions of dollars when they were forced to buy the
stock when the options were exercised at significantly higher prices.103
Although this risk is an inherent part of the securities business, it
should not be caused by investors trading on inside information regard-
ing potential takeovers.
Immediately following the halt in trading, the Pacific Stock Ex-
change and the New York Stock Exchange began an investigation to
determine which customers purchased call options and/or common
stock before the takeover announcement was made. The results indi-
cated that during the two-week period before trading in the stock and
options was halted, there were "significant and unusual purchases of
call options" which originated not only in the United States, but also
from Swiss banks. 04
98 See Federal Response Hearings, supra note 37, at 47.
99 Id at 65. An imbalance on the buy side of the market means orders to buy stock in a
company exceed orders to sell stock in the company to such an extent that there is an inability to
trade the stock.
100 A call option contract generally gives the owner the right to buy 100 shares of underlying
common stock at a specified "striking" or exercise price at anytime during the lifetime of the
contract.
101 Before the announcements, the options sold for $1.00 per contract. When trading resumed,
the price had risen to $14.25 per contract. Federal Response Hearings, supra note 37, at 34.
102 This practice is referred to as writing "naked" options. Federal Response Hearings, supra
note 37, at 51.
103 Wall St. J., Oct. 21, 1981, at 7, coL 1.
104 Federal Response Hearings, supra note 37, at 41. One Swiss banker entered orders on the
Pacific Stock Exchange to buy 2,000 option contracts representing 200,000 shares of common
stock. Id
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Under pressure from Congress, 10 5 the SEC moved into federal dis-
trict court within three weeks of the takeover announcement and won a
temporary restraining order which froze $5.2 million (the amount al-
legedly obtained through insider trading) being held in United States
brokerage and bank accounts.10 6 In an unusual and surprising move,
the SEC framed its complaint against "certain unknown puchasers."' 0 7
It argued that even though it had not completed the investigation, a
temporary restraining order was necessary in order to keep any assets
derived from insider trading from flowing outside the country.
10 8
With the funds safely frozen in New York, the SEC proceeded to
extract the names of the "certain unknown purchasers" who traded the
Santa Fe stock and options on the basis of inside information. 10 9 In
September of 1982, a director of Santa Fe International settled SEC
charges against him by agreeing to repay $278,750. This money repre-
sented the profit which the director made by buying 10,000 shares of
Santa Fe common stock through a Swiss bank account thirteen days
before the takeover was announced. 110 This case, coming at a time of
heavy merger activity and widespread buying in advance of public dis-
closure, signaled the start of an enforcement drive by the SEC to curb
insider trading.fI1
105 See Federal Response Hearings, supra note 37, at 67-71 (testimony by John Evans, Commi s-
sioner, Securities and Exchange Commission).
106 Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Santa Fe Int'l Corp., supra note 8. The SEC's princi-
pal weapon against insider trading has been the freezing of profits arising from suspected transac-
tions in American banks.
107 Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Santa Fe Int'l Corp., supra note 8.
108 LEGAL TIMES OF WASHINGTON, Nov. 30, 1981, at 2.
109 NATL' L.J., Nov. 30, 1981, at 26. These people were initially thought to be Kuwaitis trading
through Swiss banks and charges are still pending against one Kuwaiti businessman. Wall St. J.,
Jan. 26, 1983, at 7, col. I. See Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1981, at 2, col. 3. Along with the unknown
purchasers, five Swiss banks (including Credit Suisse and Swiss Banking Corp.) were named as
nominal defendants. Id See also Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1981, at 2, col. 3. This signified a departure
from the 1960s and 1970s when the banks which acted as conduits for inside traders were small
regional banks without important reputations to uphold.
110 Wall St. J., Sept. 30, 1982, at 8, col. 3. Other insider trading cases are still pending in New
York and Seattle to recover the remainder of the illegal profits. The balance of the $5.2 million is
still frozen in U.S. bank accounts pending the outcome of these cases. Id See Wall St. J., Jan. 26,
1983, at 7, col. 2 (accountant arrested for violating the court freeze by secretly transferring to
Mexico at least $250,000 in Santa Fe insider trading profits).
S11 According to SEC Chairman John Shad, "We're going to come down with hobnail boots to
give some shocking examples to inhibit activity." N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 1981, at DI, coL 3. In
what has become the agency's most productive insider trading investigation, the SEC has filed
suits around the country alleging that at least $8.5 million in illegal profit was reaped by people
privy to Santa Fe's plans. Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1983, at 23, col. 1.
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VI. THE ST. JOE MINERALS CASE
Along with the Santa Fe case, the most important event to weaken
the foundation of Swiss bank secrecy began in March 1981 when the
Canadian company, Joseph E. Seagrams & Sons, announced a tender
offer for the common stock of St. Joe Minerals Corporation. Eight
months later, with judicial assistance, the SEC pierced the veil of Swiss
bank secrecy and gained important information needed to prosecute
inside traders.'
12
Banca Della Svizzera Italiana (BSI), a Swiss bank, purchased
stock options and common shares of St. Joe one day before Seagrams
announced its tender offer. Immediately after the announcement, the
price of St. Joe common stock rose from $29.875 per share to $45.25 per
share" 3 and BSI liquidated most of the investment. These activities
resulted in a "virtually overnight" profit of approximately $1.4
million.' 1
4
Within three weeks, the SEC obtained a temporary restraining or-
der freezing $2 million, the maximum amount of alleged profits
thought to be derived from the insider trading, in BSI's United States
bank account. In addition, the order directed immediate discovery
proceedings including the disclosure of BSI's principals."' After BSI
refused to produce the requested information on the basis that such
disclosure would subject the bank to criminal liabilities under Swiss
law,"6 the SEC brought a civil action against BSI, its United States
bank, and "certain purchasers of call options," to enjoin further insider
112 Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
113 92 F.R.D. at 112. The SEC was able to ascertain that the options had been purchased by
BSI with the Geneva branch of A.G. Becker, Inc. acting as broker. Consistent with the confidenti-
ality surrounding Swiss bank dealings, A.G. Becker was not informed as to who ultimately initi-
ated the orders as the brokerage account lists only the name of the bank. N.Y. Times, Mar. 28,
1981, at 29, col. 4. The underlying stock prices of the options purchased were between $25 and
$35 per share. Thus, when the bank liquidated the options, the price of the options had increased
approximately $15 per share with a realized profit in excess of $1 million. Id
114 Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Application for an Order Compelling Answers and
Imposing Sanctions, at 2, Securities and Exchange Comm'n v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92
F.R.D. 111 (198 1) [hereinafter cited as BSI Plaintiffs Memorandum]. To demonstrate the extent
of the profits involved, A.G. Becker purchased 455 call options in St. Joe Minerals common stock
on Mar. 10 for a total of $97,825. That investment increased in value to $801,937.50 by Mar. 13.
115 92 F.R.D. at 111.
116 BSI Plaintiffs Memorandum, supra note 114, at 3. BSI argued that through the use of
"letters rogatory" the SEC could obtain the requested information without subjecting the bank to
criminal liability. Id at 4. "Letters rogatory" is defined in BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed.
1979) as "the medium whereby one country, speaking through one of its courts, requests another
country, acting through its own courts and by methods of court procedure peculiar thereto and
entirely within the latter's control, to assist the administration of justice in the former country."
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trading and require the disgorgement of all profits resulting from the
illegal trading." 7 Following a hearing, Judge Milton Pollack"18 or-
dered "prompt and fair disclosure" and threatened the bank with sub-
stantial penalties 9 if it did not comply with the court's decision.
Before the order was released, however, BSI obtained waivers of confi-
dentiality from its clients which enabled it to release customer informa-
tion without violating Swiss law.1 20
In its decision, the court applied both the "balancing of interests"
test 2 ' established in the Second Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
and the "good faith" test first used by the Supreme Court in Societe
Internationale and later adopted in the revised draft of the Second Re-
statement. In balancing the interests at stake, the court stated that a
foreign law's prohibition against disclosure is not decisive, but only one
of many factors to consider.122 It decided that the Swiss secrecy law
was outweighed by the vital national interest of the United States in
"maintaining the integrity of the securities markets against violations
committed and/or aided and assisted by the parties located abroad.'
With regard to the good faith test, the court ruled that BSI acted in bad
faith by deliberately using the Swiss nondisclosure law to evade rules
lOb-5 and 14e-3 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.' 24 Although the
court considered the hardship which the enforcement measures would
impose on the bank, it concluded that the Swiss Penal Code's flexibility
in the form of a "state of necessity" exception, as well as the bank's
The SEC does not feel this generally cumbersome procedure is of practical value. BSI Plaintiff's
Memorandum, supra note 114, at 4-5.
117 Federal Response Hearings, supra note 37, at 77.
118 Judge Pollack is a federal district judge for the Southern District of New York known for
his opinions on federal securities law.
119 These penalties included daily fines and the barring of access to U.S. securities markets.
Lowenfeld, Bank Secrecy and Insider Trading: The Banca Della Svizzera Itallana Case, 15 R1v.
OF SEC. REG. 942 (1982).
120 It is not clear what prompted BSIs clients to sign these waiveis. In addition, the bank
answered some interrogatories. Judge Pollack gave the bank a one-week extension to produce
answers to the remaining interrogatories. 92 F.R.D. at 113.
121 The court cited two recent Second Circuit opinions which adopted a balancing test ap-
proach: United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968) and Trade Dev. Bank
v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1972). See supra note 92. The court distinguished
three earlier Second Circuit decisions which viewed foreign law prohibitions as an absolute bar to
discovery on the basis that all three cases dealt with non-party witnesses. 92 F.R.D. at 115.
122 92 F.R.D. at 114.
123 Id at 112.
124 Id at 117. BSI argued that it had acted in good faith in its attempt to secure a waiver of
confidentiality from its customers, and thus complied with the SEC discovery request. The court,
however, relied on the fact that neither the State Department nor the Swiss government had ex-
pressed opposition to the discovery proceedings. It also found significant the fact that the secrecy
privilege belongs to the customer, not the bank.
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ability to obtain waivers from its clients, were sufficient protection
against criminal prosecution.'25
The BSI decision supports the principle that foreign institutions
must abide by United States statutes, including disclosure require-
ments, when they enter United States markets. In stressing the neces-
sity for uniform compliance, Judge Pollack concluded his opinion by
stating that "it would be a travesty of justice to permit a foreign com-
pany to invade American markets, violate American laws if they were
indeed violated, withdraw profits and resist accountability for itself and
its principals for the illegality by claiming their anonymity under for-
eign law."
126
Wall Street officials fear the BSI decision will force large Swiss
banks to take their investment business elsewhere in order to retain
their secrecy standards.127 Wall Street, however, should not place a
high value on the business of foreign banking institutions which facili-
tate violations of United States securities laws.128 Furthermore, this
fear is unjustified because in January 1983, Swiss banks inaugurated
insider trading rules which force their clients who trade on American
exchanges to sign waivers which will permit the banks to disclose iden-
tity and trading information to the SEC. 29 This new development is a
direct consequence of the Memorandum of Understanding on Insider
Trading signed by the United States and Switzerland in 1982.
VII. THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING
The 1977 Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters130 pro-
vides a mechanism which permits the United States and Switzerland to
furnish each other with assistance in the investigation and prosecution
of criminal matters. 31 In particular, the Treaty calls for compulsory
mutual assistance with respect to the investigation and prosecution of
125 Id at 118.
12 6 -1d at 119. The BSI case added a great deal of weight to the SEC's prosecution in the Santa
Fe case. Throughout the proceedings in Sante Fe, the SEC constantly threatened to use the BSI
holding as a precedent.
127 Swiss banks can still circumvent U.S. securities laws by buying U.S. securities on the
London Stock Exchange through British stockbrokers or London branches of U.S. banks.
128 Wall St. J., Nov. 11, 1981, at 8, col. 3.
129 N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1983, at Dl, col. 3. See infra note 149 and accompanying text.
130 Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, United States-Switzerland, 27 U.S.T.
2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302 (effective Jan. 23, 1977).
131 See Note, The Recent Swiss-American Treaty to Render Mutual Assistance in Criminal Law
Enforcement (An Application of the Bank SecrecyAct): Panacea or Placebo?, 7 Itrr'L L. & POL. 103
(1974).
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thirty-five enumerated crimes. 132 Although banking is not specifically
addressed, both governments intended that banking secrets would be
disclosed in criminal investigations.
33
Under the Treaty, however, the Swiss agree to provide legal assist-
ance in criminal matters only where such actions are mutually punish-
able under the penal laws of both the United States and Switzerland.
Thus, although the schedule of criminal matters under the Treaty in-
cludes "fraud, including . . . obtaining . . . securities by . . . any
fraudulent means,"' 134 the SEC has not been able to use the treaty to
obtain Swiss bank information relating to insider trading violations be-
cause insider trading is not a criminal offense in Switzerland. 135 Until
1982, this wide gap permitted insiders with material, non-public infor-
mation to trade on American exchanges through Swiss banks with little
risk.
After the filing of the Santa Fe case, representatives of the United
States and Swiss governments met to discuss the growing conflict in
securities law enforcement matters. 36 After extended discussions, an
interim agreement pertaining to insider trading cases not covered under
the 1977 Mutual Assistance Treaty was signed by both countries on
August 31, 1982.137 This interim agreement, embodied in a "Memo-
randum of Understanding,"' is to remain in effect until insider trading
is made a criminal offense under Swiss law.'
38
The interim agreement established a complicated procedure per-
mitting the SEC to formally request information from Swiss authori-
ties. Under this procedure, the SEC, after conducting an investigation
which indicates evidence of insider trading in a security, would make a
written request for information through the United States Department
of Justice. The Justice Department would then send this request to the
Swiss Federal Office for Police Matters which, in turn, would forward it
to a three-member commission of enquiry appointed by the Swiss
132 The emphasis of the Treaty centers on issues concerning organized crime and access to
Swiss bank information by American prosecutors and tax officials. Meyer, supra note 4, at 65.
133 Id
134 Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, supra note 130, item 19, 27 U.S.T. at 2065.
135 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
136 Greene, U.S., Switzerland Agree to Prosecute Inside Traders, LEGAL TIMES OF WAsHING-
TON, Oct. 4, 1982, at 15. The U.S. delegation was composed of officials from the SEC, the Justice
Department, and the State Department.
137 This interim agreement consists of a proposal submitted by the Swiss Bankers' Association.
U.S.-Swiss Memorandum on Insider Trading, supra note 9, at 1740.
138 On Nov. 16, 1983, the Swiss government announced that it would submit legislation to
Parliament making insider trading a crime under the Swiss Penal Code. The bill is expected to be





The written request must identify the suspected transactions and
be accompanied by relevant documentation. 140 It must also satisfy the
commission of enquiry that there were significant price or volume
movements or other indications of insider trading.141 In addition, the
transactions pertaining to the request must be related either to a busi-
ness combination or to the acquisition of at least ten percent of a com-
pany's shares. 142 This requirement, therefore, will generally exclude
insider trading based on information such as a company's poor earn-
ings prospects.
Upon accepting the request, the commission of enquiry will re-
quire the bank in question to submit a detailed report regarding the
alleged insider transaction. The bank's report will include the cus-
tomer's identity and all details of the customer's securities transactions
relating to the acquired company for forty trading days prior to the
tender offer announcement.'43 If the commission determines from the
report that the bank customer engaged in insider trading, it will send
the report to the Federal Office for Police Matters to be forwarded to
the SEC.' 4 The SEC may not disclose the information contained in
the report unless the information pertains to an SEC investigation or
enforcement action for insider trading. 145 The commission of enquiry
will also notify the bank to freeze all assets in the customer's account
up to the amount of profit gained or loss avoided." It will have the
authority to forward this amount to the SEC if judgment is entered
against the customer in a United States court or if the customer con-
sents.147 If the commission of enquiry or the SEC question the bank's
report, either agency can ask the Swiss Federal Banking Commission to
examine whether the report conforms to the facts and to the
139 U.S.-Swsr Memorandum on Insider Trading, art. 1, supra note 9, at 1740.
140 Id, art. 3(2),(3), at 1740-41.
141 Id, art. 3(4), at 1740-41. The interim agreement provides that: "The Commission shall be
satisfied in all cases in which the daily trading volume of such securities increased 50% or more at
any time during the 25 trading days prior to.. . [the announcement of an acquisition or business
combination]." Id
142 Id, art. 1, at 1740. The transactions must have been made within 25 trading days of the
announcement of the acquisition or business combination. Id, arts. 1, 3(3), at 1740.
143 Id, arL 4(3), at 1741.
144 Id, art. 5. If the Commission finds that the bank customer is not an inside trader, or did not
place the transactions identified by the SEC, it will state this in a separate report to the SEC. Id,
art. 7.
145 Id, art. 3(5).
146 Id, art. 9(1).
147 Id, arL 9(2).
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Agreement. 148
In addition to the interim agreement, the Memorandum of Under-
standing also proposed a private agreement which led to the insider
trading rules recently adopted by Swiss banks.14 9 These rules require
bank customers who trade on American securities exchanges to sign
waivers of confidentiality. Such waivers permit Swiss banks to legally
disclose customer identities and other information when the Mutual
Assistance Treaty is not applicable or when it is not possible to gather
evidence by employing compulsory process.
Many bankers feel the effectiveness of the new United States-Swiss
accord is limited because insiders still have the option of trading
through banks in other countries which also maintain strict bank se-
crecy laws. 150 In the past, secrecy laws in countries like Panama, the
Bahamas, and the Cayman Islands have been used by narcotics dealers,
organized crime figures, con artists, and tax evaders to hide their trans-
actions and assets from United States authorities.15 ' Bilateral agree-
ments with these countries are expected to be very difficult to obtain.1
52
Nevertheless, the Justice Department is currently trying to persuade
148 .1d, art. 8.
149 The Swiss Bank Corp. and Credit Suisse have asked their clients to sign a statement ac-
cepting or refusing the new conditions set for trading on American markets. Union Bank of Swit-
zerland has asked only those clients who refuse the conditions to sign a declaration to this effect.
Nevertheless, the consequences are the same. The banks' clients have been officially notified that
as of Jan. 1, 1983, an order for execution on American exchanges will be accepted only on the
express understanding that the clients agree to possible exposure to the SEC if they are suspected
of trading on inside information. N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1983, at D1, col 3.
150 N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1982, at D13, col. 6. Currently there are 26 countries which maintain
bank secrecy laws, and 22 countries which maintain "blocking" laws. Outline by John M. Fed-
ders, supra note 6, at 11-19. "Blocking" laws impede judicial or administrative proceedings by
restricting testimony or production of documents for use in such proceedings. The statutes pro-
hibit the disclosure, copying, inspection or removal of documents located in the territory of the
enacting state in compliance with orders of foreign authorities. 1d at 11.
151 Wall St. J., Sept. 2, 1982, at 4, col. 1. Nevertheless, inside traders are reluctant to place
assets in these countries which lack the political stability of Switzerland.
152 Panama, for instance, intentionally tightened its bank secrecy laws in the 1970s to lure
foreign deposits, and is reluctant to weaken them for fear of losing its newly acquired business.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1982, at D13, col. 6. One of the many alternatives to bilateral agreements
which Congress might consider in an attempt to enforce insider trading laws is "waiver by con-
duct" legislation. See Written Statement of John M. Fedders, Director, Division of Enforcement,
Securities and Exchange Commission, Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, May 24, 1983, at 12. This legislation would
declare, as a matter of U.S. law, that the act of trading securities in the United States shall consti-
tute a waiver of any otherwise applicable secrecy or blocking laws that a person or an agent may
waive. In addition, the legislation could require that brokers or dealers effecting transactions on
behalf of persons or institutions located abroad provide notice that the act of trading will be
deemed to constitute such a waiver. Id Such legislation would be similar to the private agree-
ment recently adopted by Swiss banks. See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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The United States economy directly benefits from the heavy in-
vestment of capital in its securities markets. At the same time, Switzer-
land and its financial community have a strong interest in maintaining
the integrity of the American securities markets. These markets are
international in appeal and numerous Swiss citizens, banks, and busi-
nesses are active participants. Thus, although the direct effects of in-
sider trading fall upon the United States, Switzerland shares an interest
in assuring the effective policing of American securities markets.
This shared interest is reflected by the signing of a Memorandum
of Understanding with the United States and the great progress which
has since taken place. Such developments as the voluntary implemen-
tation of insider trading rules by Swiss banks and Swiss legislation out-
lawing insider trading will greatly assist the SEC in closing the
loopholes which have plagued the American securities exchanges.
In the United States, the Santa Fe and Banca Della Svizzera Ital-
iana decisions have given the SEC unprecedented leverage against in-
side traders who use foreign banks to reap millions of dollars in profits
on United States securities markets. To completely eliminate the use of
foreign bank accounts for insider trading purposes, additional bilateral
treaties with all countries that maintain strict bank secrecy laws are
necessary. The action already taken, however, has created a strong
foundation for the principle that when foreign institutions trade securi-
ties on United States exchanges, they must abide by United States law.
This foundation is essential for preserving the health and integrity of
American securities markets.
Jonathan Levin
153 For example, the Cayman Islands, unhappy with its status as a tax haven for controversial
depositors, has offered assistance to U.S. prosecutors. Wall St. J., Oct. 14, 1982, at 33, col. 4.
